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COMCAST-NBCU, NETFLIX, AND THE FCC: THE DUAL 




The year is 2020.  The golden age of television persists, but a war for exclusive 
content has erupted.  HBO has emptied its coffers to produce another season of 
Game of Thrones.  Netflix has constructed even more lavish sets for The Crown.  
And Hulu followed The Handmaid’s Tale with multiple critically acclaimed dramas.  
Inundated by the sheer volume of programming, viewers have no choice but to sit 
before their television sets (or computers, or tablets, or phones) with glassy-eyed, 
expressionless faces and watch.
1
 
But in this not-so-distant future, the problem is too much choice.  First, 
dwindling profits in its video division prompt Comcast to allow its licensing 
agreements with Netflix to expire.  Each show now streams exclusively on 
Comcast’s proprietary service.  Then, Disney follows suit, pulling its ABC shows 
from online providers and placing them on its newly developed distribution site.  
Soon, the movies shown on FX+ are not available on Amazon, and the shows on 
Crackle do not align with those on VUDU.  Everyone with exclusive content refuses 
to share.  Viewers are forced to pay for à la carte subscriptions.  To compete with 
Comcast, Time Warner purchases a traditional network, but regulators initiate a two-
year investigation.  Yet, Netflix attempts to buy Hulu, and federal agencies simply 
watch, lacking jurisdiction to treat this merger similarly. 
This is the environment emerging under the antiquated telecommunications 
regulatory regime.  The weight of technological change has crippled a system 
designed for telephones and cable—not the internet.  Still, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC or “Commission”), other federal agencies, and 
the courts must manage the fallout.  While this Essay could discuss a variety of 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; M.Sc., London School of Economics, 
2016; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2012.  I would like to thank Professor Patricia Bellia for 
her guidance, and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their thoughtful editing and 
assistance.  I would also like to thank my parents for their support, especially my mother for 
instilling in me a love of writing.  All errors are my own. 
 1 See generally DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, INFINITE JEST (1996) (centering around a 
videotape so engaging that it is used as a weapon, forcing those who watch to lose their ability to 
function).  Wallace further describes present culture as a “U.S.A. that would die . . . for the so-
called perfect Entertainment.”  Id. at 318. 
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influential transactions, the merger discussed below was critical in introducing many 
of the issues now plaguing the industry. 
On December 3, 2009, Comcast announced it would acquire the National 
Broadcasting Company-Universal (NBCU) from General Electric (GE).
2
  This 
combination fused the largest cable company with a leader in video production.
3
  
Before the ink dried on the purchase agreement, however, consumer activists and 
competitors organized in opposition.  Specifically, they feared that non–Comcast 
subscribers would lose access to NBCU programming or pay unfair prices for 
content.
4
  Needless to say, the principal telecommunications regulators—the FCC 




The DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) historically split merger 
review jurisdiction among industries, but telecommunications transactions are 
unique in that both the DOJ and the FCC simultaneously review mergers.
6
  Yet, 
these twin processes can lead to confusion and inconsistency.
7
  For instance, the 
DOJ’s review often parallels trends in antitrust theory,
8
 taking a more free-market 
approach, while the FCC regulates with a heavier hand.
9
  These differing agency 
attitudes can result in unequal treatment and negative market consequences.
10
   
On January 18, 2011, the FCC and the DOJ approved the Comcast-NBCU 
merger.
11
  The Commission’s order (the “Order”) underscored Comcast’s ability to 
hoard its newly acquired content and to raise prices on competitors.
12
  For the first 
time, however, the FCC examined the online video distributor (OVD) market—
 
 2 See Applications and Pub. Interest Statement of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC 
Universal, Inc. at 1, MB Docket No. 10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Jan. 28, 2010). 
 3 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 550, 555 (2009) [hereinafter FCC 
Competition Report]. 
 4 See Tim Arango, G.E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go to Comcast, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/business/media/04nbc.html (describing the deal’s 
political tensions). 
 5 Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to 
Assign Licenses & Transfer Control of Licensees, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4246–47 (2011) [hereinafter 
Comcast-NBCU Order]. 
 6 See Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative 
Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 29. 
 7 Id. at 31. 
 8 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (following 
Sylvania—per se illegality of vertical integration is unnecessary); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (moving away from per se vertical merger illegality).  See generally 
Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. 
ON REG. 171, 188 (2002) (discussing how the Chicago School questioned the need to regulate 
vertical mergers). 
 9 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 34. 
 10 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 227 (2d ed. 2001) (“Because there are motives 
for mergers unrelated to either monopolistic intent or economies of integration, one cannot be 
certain that a series of vertical mergers reflects the existence of substantial economies of vertical 
integration . . . .”). 
 11 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4243. 
 12 Id. at 4250–51. 
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Netflix, Hulu, Amazon—as a potential threat to multichannel video programming 
distributors (MVPDs) like Comcast.
13
  Because of this market’s embryonic state, the 
FCC felt the merger threatened its development and imposed conditions to ensure 
its growth.  While the FCC correctly included this burgeoning technology in its 
analysis, it failed to accurately process how this market would develop.  Like a new 
parent, the FCC insulated the nascent OVDs from competition—all but ensuring 
their unchecked expansion. 
This Essay argues that the FCC inconsistently dissects market trends, and its 
costly processes—paired with DOJ review—stymie growth in the 
telecommunications industry.  Part I traces the history of dual review and compares 
the FCC’s procedures with the DOJ’s.  Part II evaluates the Comcast-NBCU deal—
its history, the FCC Order, and the conditions imposed.  Part III argues that the FCC 
is not adept at analyzing telecommunications transactions, and is certainly not adept 
at predicting market developments.  It then claims that the Comcast-NBCU deal 
unearthed serious problems in the dual review process.  Specifically, jurisdictional 
restrictions facing the FCC limit the types of transactions it can regulate, as 
compared to traditional antitrust agencies.  Ultimately, this Essay recommends that 
the DOJ have sole authority to review mergers because it can apply a consistent 
framework to all telecommunications transactions. 
I.     THE FCC AND DUAL REVIEW 
Created during the New Deal era, the FCC initially sought to make 
“available . . . a rapid, efficient . . . wire and radio communication service with 
adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”
14
  This straightforward task expanded 
through time to include modern technology.
15
  Nevertheless, the FCC’s chief duties 
still include issuing broadcast licenses
16
 and ensuring that consumers have access to 
telecommunications services.
17




The agencies traditionally responsible for this review, the DOJ and the FTC, 
derive their authority from a series of antitrust statutes.  First, the Sherman Antitrust 
Act grants enforcement power to prevent unreasonable “restraint[s] of trade or 
commerce,”
19
 and to prevent “monopoliz[ation].”
20
  Next, the Clayton Act places 
 
 13 Id. at 4267. 
 14 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)). 
 15 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).  
 16 See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (outlining license transfer procedures). 
 17 See id. § 151. 
 18 Though “public interest” has a broad definition, one goal of its use in the FCC context is 
universal consumer coverage.  See id. §§ 214, 310 (stating that license transfers must promote “the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity”); see also Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 34 n.20 
(reiterating the source(s) of FCC merger review authority). 
 19 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (2012)). 
 20 Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2). 
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default merger jurisdiction in the FTC and the DOJ.
21
  Under this law, both agencies 
regulate instances of price discrimination
22
 and review mergers crossing certain 
thresholds.
23
  Further, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
establishes premerger notification and filing procedures.
24
 
Conversely, the Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC authority to 
regulate mergers through the spectrum license transfer process—that is, whether the 
“public interest, convenience, and necessity w[ould] be served” in the transfer.
25
  In 
addition, section 214 gives the Commission authority to regulate “acquisition[s] of 
lines by a common carrier” using the public interest standard.
26
  At the same time, 
Congress granted the FTC superfluous jurisdiction to review mergers involving 
common carriers under sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act.
27
  But when the FCC 
discusses its jurisdiction, it “invariably notes this authority, then states that it need 
not rely upon the Clayton Act because the Commission’s review under the 
Communications Act[’s public interest standard] is sufficient.”
28
  This public interest 
standard has been “construed broadly”
29
 to grant the Commission wide latitude to 
intervene in the industry.  
The DOJ and the FTC divide jurisdiction among particular industries to avoid 
overlap.
30
  In telecommunications transactions, however, the FCC is charged with 
reviewing mergers that the DOJ also regulates, creating a dual review process with 
inconsistent standards.
31
  The FCC’s process is arduous, while the DOJ’s antitrust 
procedures are more straightforward.  For instance,  
     [a]ny DOJ challenge to a proposed merger requires the DOJ to bear the burden 
of proving a violation of the antitrust laws.  This procedural posture is crucial—
mergers are presumed not to substantially lessen competition absent a contrary 
showing.  Against this backdrop, the DOJ’s analysis of proposed mergers results 





 21 Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, ch. 323, § 7A, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 18a). 
 22 15 U.S.C. § 13. 
 23 Id. § 18a. 
 24 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 
Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a). 
 25 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2012). 
 26 STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND 
POLICY 489 (4th ed. 2015). 
 27 Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 7, 11, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 18, 21(a)) (giving the FCC enforcement jurisdiction over “common carriers”). 
 28 Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 41.  
 29 William J. Rinner, Comment, Optimizing Dual Agency Review of Telecommunications 
Mergers, 118 YALE L.J. 1571, 1574 (2009). 
 30 See William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes 
Substance, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1022–26 (2012) (reviewing DANIEL A. CRANE, THE 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (2011)). 
 31 See Rinner, supra note 29, at 1577 (“Parties seeking to merge must clear regulatory hurdles 
set at different heights—transactions that clear the DOJ’s well-advertised test might compel the 
FCC to attach broad-ranging conditions.”). 
 32 Id. at 1573–74 (footnote omitted).  
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Thus, the DOJ fosters free-market principles by blocking only substantially 
anticompetitive transactions,
33
 whereas “the FCC frequently uses merger reviews as 
forums for advancing its regulatory agenda.”
34
  It accomplishes this by “order[ing] 
merging parties to submit to conditions in order to obtain license transfer 
approval.”
35
  And lack of approval ultimately blocks the deal.
36
 
From a procedural standpoint, the DOJ and the FTC can review mergers in any 
industry, provided that the transactions are anticompetitive.  The FCC’s threshold 
for jurisdiction, however, is limited to broadcast license transfers or the acquisition 
of wire infrastructure.  That said, once the FCC has jurisdiction, it is constrained 
only by the broad public interest standard.
37
  The result: “In adjudications, the 
Commission can advance its policies in a way that seems entirely fact-specific, 
which leaves it room to retain its position in the next case or to abandon it at will.”
38
  
Not bound by rulemaking’s formalities, the FCC has flexibility to make 
unpredictable, nonprecedential decisions. 
A final difference is timing.  The DOJ process is bound by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act,
39
 where “[n]otification of a proposed merger triggers a thirty-day 
waiting period.”
40
  No action results in implicit acceptance.
41
  However, the FCC 
faces no such constraint.  Only “[a] self-imposed 180-day deadline” exists (though 
is rarely adhered to).
42
  In the end, the FCC’s unclear process may chill investment, 
deter mergers, and stymie long-term planning efforts. 
At the core of the FCC’s review, however, is the public interest standard.  The 
Commission “employs a balancing test, weighing any potential public interest harms 
of the proposed transaction against any potential public interest benefits.”
43
  And it 
applies opaque standards like the affected quality of “communications services,” 
“technological . . . changes,” and “trends within the communications industry.”
44
  
Ultimately the applicants “bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 




 33 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 39. 
 34 Id. at 34.  See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 330 (1989) (arguing that broadcasters give the FCC a wide 
berth by preemptively censoring themselves, fearing that the agency will overregulate otherwise). 
 35 Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 62. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See id. at 66; see also BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 26, at 491 (“[T]he FCC’s merger 
review standards are potentially much broader than the standards applied under the antitrust 
laws . . . .”). 
 38 Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 67. 
 39 See generally Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012)). 
 40 Rinner, supra note 29, at 1573. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 1574. 
 43 Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4247. 
 44 Id. at 4248 (admitting that the FCC’s analysis is “informed by but not limited to traditional 
antitrust principles”). 
 45 Id. at 4247. 
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II.     BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE COMCAST-NBCU MERGER 
Abstract discussions of dual review are feasible, but a better pedagogical 
strategy examines agency processes through the lens of past transactions.  Here, 
Comcast-NBCU serves as the focal point because it brings into sharp relief many 
current issues in the video market. 
In 2006, Comcast was the largest cable provider in the Americas.
46
  Through 
the 2000s, Comcast pursued an aggressive growth strategy, most notably in its failed 
bid to take over The Walt Disney Corporation for $54.1 billion.
47
  But despite its 




NBC was founded in 1926.
49
  One of the preeminent networks since inception, 
it now houses an array of stations.
50
  In 1986, GE took control of NBC, and in 2004 
it purchased a majority stake in Universal, forming NBCU.
51
  This combination 




In December 2009, GE announced a deal to cede control of NBCU to 
Comcast.
53
  Initially, it was structured as a joint venture, where Comcast would 
control fifty-one percent, but over time it could purchase the remaining shares for 
$30 billion.
54
  For GE, this was one of several post–financial crisis divestitures to 
shift back to its industrial roots.
55
  For Comcast, NBCU fit within the company’s 
 
 46 See FCC Competition Report, supra note 3, at 555–56 & tbl. 2 (showing that, as of June 
2006, Comcast, with 21.5 million subscribers, had approximately double the subscribers of its 
closest competitor, Time Warner). 
 47 Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast Pulls Disney Bid Off the Table, and Wall Street Breathes a 
Sigh of Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/business/comcast-pulls-disney-bid-off-the-table-and-wall-
street-breathes-a-sigh-of-relief.html. 
 48 See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, The Results of the Worst Company in America Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010), https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/the-worst-company-in-
america/; see also Alison Griswold, The Most Hated Merger in America, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/04/comcast_time_warner_cable_merger_
why_it_fell_apart.htm (arguing that Comcast’s actions led to negative reactions). 
 49 Our History, NBCUNIVERSAL, http://www.nbcuniversal.com/our-history (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2018). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4244. 
 53 See David B. Wilkerson & Steve Goldstein, Comcast Scores Controlling Stake in NBC 
Universal, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/comcast-to-buy-
nbc-stake-as-venture-formed-2009-12-03 (“The long-awaited agreement would give Comcast 
control of one the country’s most storied broadcast networks . . . .”). 
 54 See David Goldman & Julianne Pepitone, GE, Comcast Announce Joint NBC Deal, 
CNNMONEY (Dec. 3, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/03/news/companies/comcast_nbc/; 
see also Press Release, Comcast, Comcast to Acquire Gen. Elec.’s 49% Common Equity 
Ownership Interest in NBCUniversal (Feb. 12, 2013), http://corporate.comcast.com/news-
information/news-feed/comcast-to-acquire-general-electrics-common-equity-ownership-interest-
in-nbcuniversal. 
 55 See Press Release, Gen. Elec., GE to Create Simpler, More Valuable Indus. Co. by Selling 
Most GE Capital Assets; Potential to Return More Than $90 Billion to Inv’rs Through 2018 in 
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growth model,
56




The deal was at best met with suspicion,
58
 and at worst, full-scale opposition.
59
  
Most of the industry remained silent, especially competitor MVPDs, but 
programmers feared Comcast would leverage its network to unfairly benefit 
NBCU.
60
  Yet, early commentary indicated begrudging acceptance, as “[m]ost 




Nevertheless, Comcast endured both FCC and DOJ review,
62
 eliciting over 
29,000 comments and months of hearings.
63
  DISH Network, a distribution 
opponent, feared that Comcast would leverage its network to limit customers’ access 
to NBCU programming.  In their petition to deny, DISH argued that “[t]he merged 
Comcast-NBCU would have a greater incentive and ability to discriminate against 
competitors in the online video and [MVPD] markets than [did] either company pre-
merger.”
64
  From a content standpoint, Bloomberg carried the torch in opposition.  
At stake was its popular business news service: Bloomberg TV.  It argued that 
pairing the largest MVPD with one of the largest content providers would uniquely 
position Comcast to unfairly “discriminate against BTV to protect [Comcast-
NBCU].”
65
  Arguing that news networks must retain objectivity and free-flowing 
 
Dividends, Buyback & Synchrony Exch. (Apr. 10, 2015), 
https://www.ge.com/sites/default/files/ge_webcast_press_release_04102015_1.pdf (providing 
another example where GE ridded itself of divisions outside its core business). 
 56 Cf. Paul R. La Monica, Comcast Bids for Disney, CNNMONEY (Feb. 18, 2004), 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/11/news/companies/comcast_disney/ (discussing the Disney bid). 
 57 See Press Release, Comcast, Comcast and GE Receive Regulatory Clearance for NBC 
Universal Transaction (Jan. 18, 2011), http://corporate.comcast.com/images/Comcast-GE-
Regulatory-Clearance-FINAL-11811.pdf [hereinafter Comcast Regulatory Clearance Press 
Release]. 
 58 Brian Stelter, In NBC-Comcast Deal, Quiet Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/business/media/21comcast.html. 
 59 Joe Flint, Comcast-NBC Universal Merger Draws Criticism, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/22/business/la-fi-ct-fcc-20100622. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See Stelter, supra note 58; see also Cecilia Kang, Comcast-NBC Merger Gains Traction, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122305390.html (mentioning that the FCC Chairman 
would vote for the merger).  
 62 See Comcast Regulatory Clearance Press Release, supra note 57; see also Competitive 
Impact Statement at 6–7, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11-cv-00106, 2011 WL 5402137 
(D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement], 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/competitive-impact-statement-72 (commenting on the 
coordination between agencies). 
 63 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4246. 
 64 Petition to Deny of DISH Network L.L.C. and Echostar Corp. at ii, Applications for 
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses Gen. Elec. Co. to Comcast Corp., MB Docket No. 
10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n June 21, 2010) (stating that Comcast and NBCU showed “a 
propensity to leverage its power to thwart competitors”). 
 65 Petition to Deny at 4, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses Gen. 
Elec. Co. to Comcast Corp., MB Docket No. 10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n June 21, 2010). 
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information, Bloomberg invoked a purposive reading of the public interest standard 
to condemn the deal.
66
 
Yet, when the dust settled, regulators approved the merger and issued separate 
opinions describing their respective decisions.
67
  This review process, in particular, 
fostered “unprecedented” cooperation between the agencies,
68
 so the conditions 
were roughly identical.
69
  That said, the FCC and the DOJ analyzed the market in 
subtly different, but important, ways.  Part II discusses the FCC’s analysis of the 
programming and distribution markets.  Then it briefly compares this analysis to the 
DOJ’s.  Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the conditions imposed on the 
parties. 
A.   FCC and DOJ Market Analyses 
The Commission focused its analysis on two categories: competitive harms to 
MVPDs and competitive harms to OVDs.
70
  The Order acknowledged that “[t]his 
transaction would effectuate an unprecedented aggregation of video programming 
content.”
71
  As the largest cable distributor, Comcast could command a “higher price 
in negotiations over the terms of arrangements for [NBCU] programming” with 
competitor MVPDs.
72
  Comcast claimed, however, that its new programming 
division would only account for approximately thirteen percent of the content 
market; thus, the threat against competitor MVPDs was overblown.
73
  The FCC 
determined, however, that “[t]he record show[ed] that the loss of Comcast-NBCU 
programming, including the programming contributed by NBCU, would harm rival 
video distributors, reducing their ability or incentive to compete with Comcast for 
subscribers.”
74
   
The Commission also evaluated how the Comcast-NBCU merger would affect 
the burgeoning OVD market.
75
  It stated that “[o]ne half of American consumers 
 
 66 Id.  
 67 Eliza Krigman, FCC Approves Comcast-NBC Merger, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/01/fcc-approves-comcast-nbc-merger-047757. 
 68 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Justice Dep’t Allows Comcast-NBCU 
Joint Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-allows-comcast-nbcu-joint-venture-proceed-conditions. 
 69 Compare Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4240–41 (listing the conditions), with 
United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11-cv-00106, 2011 WL 5402137, at *4–12 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 
2011) (articulating comparable conditions). 
 70 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4250, 4263. 
 71 Id. at 4240. 
 72 Id. at 4251 (commenting that Comcast “engaged in foreclosure strategies in the past”); see 
also id. at 4258–59 (“In fact, [Comcast-NBCU’s] own documents support the conclusion that some 
of the national cable networks combined in this transaction have such loyal viewers that the 
transaction will allow Comcast-NBCU to extract higher rents from MVPDs.”); id. at 4255–56 
(limiting the market size of MVPDs to cable-related services). 
 73 Id. at 4252. 
 74 Id. at 4254; see also id. at 4255 (treating Comcast as the sole owner of this joint venture 
with GE). 
 75 See id. at 4263. 
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watch some video over the Internet.”
76
  Therefore, the FCC wrote that “as a vertically 
integrated company, Comcast will have the incentive and ability to hinder 
competition from other OVDs.”
77
  Next, the FCC listed anticompetitive strategies 
Comcast might employ to limit OVD growth, including restrictions of “access to or 
raising the price of affiliated online content; . . . blocking, degrading, or otherwise 
violating open Internet principles[; and] . . . using Comcast set-top boxes to hinder 
the delivery of unaffiliated online video.”
78
 
There was a natural fear that Comcast could withhold content from OVDs, with 
the FCC admitting that these services posed a threat to traditional MVPDs.  
Commenters responded, arguing that OVDs “already—or soon will—provide viable 
commercial alternatives to traditional MVPDs.”
79
  Comcast, however, argued that 
these online streaming services did not compete directly, but rather were 
“supplement[al].”
80
  The cable provider also stated that OVDs could not stand alone 
as profitable businesses because “it is too expensive for OVDs to purchase 
professional video from the content owners, who make significantly more money by 
selling to the traditional MVPDs.”
81
  The Commission agreed that “cord-cutting” 
rarely occurred and that “most consumers today do not see OVD service as a 
substitute for their MVPD service, but as an additional method of viewing 
programming.”
82
  The FCC’s mixed reading shines through.  It admits that OVDs 
pose a competitive threat, but it couches its analysis in language that fails to describe 
these services as legitimate substitutes. 
The DOJ released its findings and its final judgment on the same day the FCC 
released its Order.
83
  The conditions were filed in district court, but in accordance 
with the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, the Department also considered the 
merger’s competitive impact.
84
  Thus, it simultaneously released a competitive 
impact statement (the “Statement”) to assess the industry. 
Here, the two agencies drew similar conclusions about the budding OVD 
industry.  Like the FCC Order, the Statement claimed that “Comcast and other 
MVPDs recognize the threat posed to their video distribution business from the 
growth of OVDs.”
85
  And further, it noted that “Comcast’s and other MVPDs’ 





 76 Id. at 4264 (claiming that online distribution “figures prominently in the plans of many 
MVPDs and other OVDs”). 
 77 Id. at 4263. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 4267. 
 80 Id. at 4268.  But see MCKINSEY & CO., GLOBAL MEDIA REPORT 5 (2015), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/media-and-entertainment/our-insights/global-media-report-
2015 (claiming that cord-cutting has become more prevalent). 
 81 Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4268. 
 82 Id. at 4269. 
 83 See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 62, at 1. 
 84 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012). 
 85 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 62, at 19. 
 86 Id. at 20. 
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However, parts of the DOJ analysis revealed a more nuanced understanding of 
the online video industry.  It claimed that OVDs “represent the most likely prospect 
for successful competitive entry into the existing video programming distribution 
market.”
87
  Unlike the FCC, it acknowledged differences in OVD service models, 
and that “undoubtedly [some OVDs] will be viewed by consumers as closer 
substitutes for MVPD services than others.”
88
  Moreover, the DOJ admitted that it 
was uncertain as to future market developments.  Yet, any technological changes 
“would follow standard merger evaluation principles and consider not only the role 
of OVDs, but also factors such as the extent to which the merging firms’ offerings 
are close substitutes and compete directly.”
89
  Therefore, rather than making 
unilateral rulings on a case-by-case basis, the DOJ stated it would continue to follow 
time-tested antitrust practices.  In sum, the FCC had the wherewithal to envision 
OVDs as a competitive threat, but it failed to take the next step in analyzing future 
developments that might affect the conditions it ultimately imposed. 
B.   The FCC’s Merger Approval Conditions 
The Commission found that Comcast had incentives to withhold NBCU 
content from MVPDs, and even though the OVD market was small in 2010, Comcast 
believed it could eventually threaten the industry.  Therefore, in close coordination, 
both the DOJ and the FCC imposed conditions on the Comcast-NBCU merger.  This 
Section, however, focuses specifically on the FCC Order. 
First, the Commission wanted to ensure that other MVPDs had access to 
NBCU programming on equal terms.  As part of this condition, the FCC adopted an 
arbitration process to provide companies access to formal proceedings to “resolv[e] 
disputes about prices, terms, and conditions for licensing.”
90
 
Next, the Commission wanted to safeguard OVDs from MVPDs withholding 
content.
91
  It required Comcast to offer NBCU content “at fair market value and non-
discriminatory prices.”
92
  The cable conglomerate also had to grant OVDs access at 
the same nondiscriminatory prices.
93
  Further, the Commission prevented Comcast 
from entering “into agreements to hamper online distribution of its own video 
programming or programming of other providers.”
94
  To supplement these 
conditions, the FCC wanted to guarantee that online providers had access to 
 
 87 Id. at 28; see also id. at 17 (imagining OVDs as a threat depends upon factors “such as the 
OVD’s ability to obtain popular content, its ability to protect the licensed content from piracy, its 
financial strength, and its technical capabilities to deliver high-quality content”). 
 88 Id. at 17. 
 89 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).  The DOJ competitive impact statement does not quite predict 
the current market segmentation among OVDs, but it mentions consumer use of multiple OVDs.  
Id. at 18 (“[C]ustomers may rely on an individual OVD or may view video content from a number 
of OVDs . . . .”). 
 90 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4241. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id.  The Cable Act of 1992 first envisioned vertical integration problems associated with 
video distribution.  See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 93 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4241. 
 94 Id. 
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broadband at “reasonable prices and . . . sufficient bandwidth.”
95
  The underlying 
fear in the Order was Comcast’s mountain of exclusive content, and the conditions 
ensured “that Comcast not discriminate in video programming distribution.”
96
 
To shepherd the deal past the regulators, Comcast also agreed to several 
voluntary conditions.  These included broadband access to low-income households 
and assurances that NBCU would provide local news and children’s programming.
97
  
While consumer access to fairly priced content underpinned most of the FCC’s 




III.     RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE FCC IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS 
The postmerger commentary was skeptical, yet still optimistic.  Opponents 
objected to the merger of “programming and distribution when News Corp. acquired 
DirecTV in 2003, only to see News Corp. reverse the transaction five short years 
later.”
99
  Additionally, Time Warner spun off its cable business in 2008, creating a 
more focused organization.
100
  These maneuvers suggest that trepidation with 
Comcast-NBCU was overblown, but scholars feared “Comcast still sought to slow 
down the growth of OVDs until it could transition its customers to its own Internet-
based video distribution platform.”
101
  Others claimed, however, that “it is hard to 
see how [Comcast] could use its control over content to harm competition.  To do 
so would require the merged company to have a dominant position in content and 
the market to be protected by entry barriers.”
102
  While the Commission lacked the 
requisite crystal ball to forecast the future market, the comments above demonstrate 
the uncertainty surrounding this transaction. 
This Part evaluates the flaws in the FCC’s analysis.  It discusses recent market 
developments, which are a byproduct of this merger.  Next, it argues that dual review 
failed the telecommunications industry.  Finally, it claims that consumers would 
benefit by ceding authority to traditional antitrust agencies. 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 4287. 
 97 Id. at 4242. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Christopher S. Yoo, Technological Determinism and Its Discontents, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
914, 917 (2014) (reviewing SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY 
AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2013)). 
 100 Press Release, Time Warner, Time Warner and Time Warner Cable Agree to Separation 
(May 21, 2008), http://ir.timewarner.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70972&p=irol-twcseparation. 
 101 Yoo, supra note 99, at 933; see also Tom Teodorczuk, Comcast Is Trying to Win Over 
Millennials with New Streaming Service, MARKETWATCH (July 28, 2017), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/comcast-is-trying-to-win-over-millennials-with-new-
streaming-service-2017-07-27 (targeting millennials with Xfinity Instant TV). 
 102 Yoo, supra note 99, at 935. 
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A.   Mistakes in the FCC’s Analysis 
The FCC merger review is derived from the public interest language embedded 
in the Communications Act,
103
 which invokes the New Deal–era belief that agencies 
deliver nonpolitical expertise.
104
  While the DOJ and the FTC have proficient merger 
procedures,
105
 the FCC is expected to possess more knowledge about 
telecommunications transactions.
106
  Still, the FCC frequently faces criticism 
because of its bloated processes.
107
 
In this instance, the Commission misjudged the progression of the online video 
market and protected OVDs to the detriment of MVPDs.  The FCC highlighted 
commenters claiming “that OVDs need NBCU content to be effective 
competitors.”
108
  At base, Comcast was required to fairly deal with OVDs to ensure 
their survival.  While it is easy to gloss over this statement, it underpins the 
conditions imposed on Comcast and generates a few problematic assumptions.
109
 
First, it assumes OVDs are limited in the content they can acquire.  But NBCU 
only constituted approximately thirteen percent of the programming market.
110
  
OVDs had access to a vast library outside Comcast’s control.
111
  For instance, when 




 103 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 309(a) (2012). 
 104 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938); see also GARY 
LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72 (7th ed. 2016) (“The structure of administrative 
institutions . . . cannot help but be shaped by the theories of agency behavior that are dominant at 
any particular time.”). 
 105 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
 106 Cf. BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 26, at 487 (discussing the FCC’s power to review 
telecommunications mergers and the remedies it can independently impose, distinct from those 
remedies imposed by antitrust agencies). 
 107 See, e.g., Brendan Sasso, The FCC Has the ‘Worst Idea in the History of the Civilized 
World!!!!!!’, ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/the-fcc-has-the-worst-idea-in-the-history-
of-the-civilized-world/457233/ (showing that comments flooded the FCC in response to a rule 
allowing cell phones on planes). 
 108 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4268.  But see Competitive Impact Statement, 
supra note 62, at 11 (emphasizing that growth of OVDs depends, in part, on their ability to acquire 
programming from content providers). 
 109 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING 
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 8–11 (1985) (outlining the framework for analyzing competitive 
markets). 
 110 Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4252. 
 111 See Opposition to Petitions to Deny and Response to Comments at 182–84, Applications 
of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses or 
Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n June 21, 2010) 
[hereinafter Comcast Opposition] (arguing that Comcast would not have the market power to limit 
OVDs). 
 112 See Julianne Pepitone, Amazon Prime Scores Viacom Shows After Netflix Deal Expires, 
CNN (June 4, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/04/technology/amazon-viacom/index.html 
(discussing Viacom’s signing with Amazon after the Netflix deal expired). 
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(Paramount, MTV, Nickelodeon, et al.) and Disney
113
 (Pixar, ABC, ESPN, et al.), 
in addition to NBCU.
114
  The FCC’s assumption only makes sense if other 
programmers refused access to OVDs, which at the time rarely occurred.
115
 
Second, the FCC assumed that OVDs cannot provide original content.
116
  Yet, 
Netflix began spending billions of dollars on shows like House of Cards and Orange 
Is the New Black.  In the third quarter of 2017, it spent $2.6 billion developing new 
programming.
117
  In addition to this never-ending stream of content, many OVDs 
continue to license rerun shows.
118
  This creates a steady diet of new and existing 
content, illustrating how OVDs can independently present competitive challenges to 
MVPDs. 
Finally, the statement assumes OVDs will remain dependent upon distributors.  
While the FCC opinion notes that OVDs are not purely supplemental, the conditions 
assume as much.
119
  Comcast-NBCU was forced to offer its content at competitive 
prices to OVDs.
120
  Perhaps OVDs were dependent at infancy, but they have now 
grown so significantly that they pose challenges to MVPDs.  The new Disney service 
is the best example of OVD independence, and their ability to operate without the 
crutch of cable distribution.  Here, the FCC failed to foresee these developments, 
and its merger conditions did little to facilitate a competitive market. 
B.   Video Programming Developments 
In the beginning, Netflix and other OVDs licensed network shows, acting as 
centralized content hubs.
121
  Consumers received shows at any time, often under a 
 
 113 See Doreen McCallister, Disney Will End Netflix Deal and Offer Its Own Streaming 
Services, NPR (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/08/09/542353743/disney-will-end-netflix-deal-and-offer-its-own-streaming-services 
(announcing Disney’s competitor service). 
 114 See Julianne Pepitone, Netflix Renews Contract for NBCUniversal Movies and TV, 
CNNMONEY (July 13, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/13/technology/netflix_nbc/index.htm (discussing the first deal 
between Netflix and NBCU postmerger). 
 115 Comcast Opposition, supra note 111, at 181–82 (demonstrating Comcast’s belief that the 
“combined entity would need to have market power in online video programming content”). 
 116 Neither the FCC Order nor the DOJ final judgment refer to OVDs potentially producing 
original content.  See generally United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11-cv-00106, 2011 WL 
5402137 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2011); Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5. 
 117 See Max A. Cherney, Here’s How to Break Down the Billions Netflix Spends on Original 
Movies and Shows, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-
netflix-reveals-the-billions-it-spends-on-content-2017-10-16. 
 118 See Mark Rogowsky, How Are the Negotiating Dynamics Changing Between Netflix and 
the Movie / TV Studios?, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/01/10/how-are-the-negotiating-dynamics-changing-
between-netflix-and-the-movie-tv-studios/#2f94f67f18a3 (arguing that OVD growth increases the 
value of licensing agreements). 
 119 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4269. 
 120 Id. at 4241. 
 121 See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 62, at 15–17. 
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monthly fee, per transaction fee, or free-with-ads pay structure.
122
  Networks did not 
believe there was “much appetite” for streaming services, so they licensed shows 
inexpensively.
123
  But as streaming became profitable, networks sought to exploit 
these licensing agreements.
124
  As a result, Netflix shifted its focus to original 
content; therefore, the “library has become increasingly exclusive.”
125
  Amazon 
tripled the number of original shows last year,
126
 while Apple is budgeting one 
billion dollars for original content in 2018.
127
 
The breadth of content and the meteoric growth of subscriptions rightfully 
worried traditional producers.  As Netflix expanded, it utilized its subscription base 
to gain leverage over production studios,
128
 signing exclusive agreements that forced 
distribution through Netflix.
129
  This created resentment within the industry—so 
much so that networks began allowing their licensing agreements to expire.
130
  In 
turn, many services now produce exclusive content, with limited network 
programming. 
As a result, studios are searching for new content delivery streams.  For 
example, FX partnered with Comcast to create FX+: Comcast customers, for a 
 
 122 This statement is generally true; however, OVDs operate a variety of business models.  
For more information, see id. at 11, 16–17. 
 123 See Todd VanDerWerff, Why Shows Leave Netflix, VOX (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/3/30/15114748/why-shows-leave-netflix (offering a 
descriptive account of this market evolution). 
 124 See id.; see also David Ng, Netflix Is on the Hook for $20 Billion. Can It Keep Spending 
Its Way to Success?, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-
ct-netflix-debt-spending-20170729-story.html (arguing that fees continue to increase).  To provide 
an example, Netflix spent $2 million per episode for Blacklist, a popular show.  See Teresa Jue, 
Netflix Acquires ‘The Blacklist’ for $2 Million an Episode, ENT. WEEKLY (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://ew.com/article/2014/08/28/netflix-acquires-the-blacklist-for-2-million-per-episode/ (“The 
$2 million price tag will be the largest per-episode fee paid by a subscription-based video-on-
demand company for a television show.”). 
 125 Top Investor Questions, NETFLIX, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171116025216/https://ir.netflix.com/faq.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2018). 
 126 See Adam Levy, Amazon’s Content Budget Is Catching Up with Netflix’s (If It Hasn’t 
Already), MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/04/18/amazons-
content-budget-is-catching-up-with-netflix.aspx. 
 127 See Todd Spangler, Apple Sets $1 Billion Budget for Original TV Shows, Movies (Report), 
VARIETY (Aug. 16, 2017), http://variety.com/2017/digital/news/apple-1-billion-original-tv-shows-
movies-budget-1202529421/. 
 128 See Ashley Rodriguez, Netflix and Amazon Are Now So Big That They’re Changing the 
Way Global TV Shows Are Financed, QUARTZ (Mar. 29, 2017), https://qz.com/944921/netflix-
nflx-and-amazon-amzn-are-now-so-big-that-theyre-changing-the-way-global-tv-shows-are-
financed-starting-in-the-uk/. 
 129 See Lucas Shaw, Netflix’s Biggest Critic Responds with His Own Paid Service, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-25/netflix-s-
biggest-critic-responds-with-a-paid-service-of-his-own (expressing anger over the exclusive deal 
to license American Crime Story: The People v. O.J. Simpson). 
 130 See Christopher Palmeri, Disney to Launch Online-Only ESPN, Drops Movie Deal with 
Netflix, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-
08/disney-to-launch-online-only-espn-drops-movie-deal-with-netflix. 
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monthly fee, gain access to FX’s entire catalogue.
131
  At the same time, Comcast is 
testing its own service to compete with OVDs, called Xfinity Instant TV.
132
  
Additionally, Disney’s service may alter the market because ESPN streaming would 
create the first foray into online sports viewing—not to mention access to their 
famed movie studios (Marvel, Lucas Films, Pixar, Walt Disney Studios).
133
 
The current video world is one of immense competition, and the central-hub 
conception of OVDs is in jeopardy.  The success of Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu 
created a backlash.  In an effort to compete, streaming services are now available 
through MVPDs, OVDs, and even traditional studios.  The theory of “cord-cutting” 
was gaining traction,
134
 but as content went directly online, it created market 
segmentation.  Consumers once received content in a single location, but now 
programmers are becoming possessive of their content.  The result is an endless 
array of services with little overlap.  Now, commentators believe “cord-cutting” will 
make little economic sense for consumers, and that overall entertainment bills will 
rival the cable bills once complained of—a development contrary to what the FCC 
envisioned in its attempt to protect OVDs from Comcast-NBCU.
135
 
C.   Dual Review Exposed in the Comcast-NBCU Merger 
While other industries work with either the DOJ or the FTC, 
telecommunications companies manage two processes simultaneously.  Again, the 
Commission derives its merger authority from a few statutes.  First, the FCC has 
authority to review spectrum license transfers or the acquisition of lines by a 
common carrier.
136
  But the “Commission possesses no statutory authority to review 
‘mergers’ writ large,”
137
 because these provisions address only limited aspects of the 
industry.  And technological advances could limit the FCC’s authority.  Still, once 




 131 See Press Release, Comcast, FX Networks Partners with Comcast to Launch New Serv. 
Sept. 5th (Aug. 7, 2017), http://corporate.comcast.com/news-information/news-feed/fx-networks-
new-service. 
 132 See Nelson Granados, Comcast Launches XFinity Instant TV with Entry-Level Video 
Bundle; Will It Succeed?, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nelsongranados/2017/09/29/comcast-goes-over-the-top-with-
xfinity-instant-tv-will-it-succeed/#4589a497147b. 
 133 See Press Release, The Walt Disney Co., The Walt Disney Co. to Acquire Majority 
Ownership of BAMTech (Aug. 8, 2017), https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/walt-disney-
company-acquire-majority-ownership-bamtech/. 
 134 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4268; see also Jeffrey Prince & Shane 
Greenstein, Measuring Consumer Preferences for Video Content Provision via Cord-Cutting 
Behavior, 26 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 293, 314 (2017) (arguing that cord-cutting occurs most 
often among lower-income households and younger consumers). 
 135 Todd VanDerWerff, Netflix or Hulu Won’t Win the Streaming Wars. Your Cable Company 
Will, VOX (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.vox.com/new-money/2016/10/13/13156848/netflix-hulu-
amazon-cable (“[I]f you subscribed to every streaming service . . . your monthly bill would be more 
expensive than an average cable bill on its cheapest tier.”). 
 136 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 309(a), 310(d) (2012). 
 137 Applications of Ameritech Corp. & SBC Commc’ns Inc., 14 FCC Rcd. 14712, 15188 
(1999) (Comm’r Harold Furchtgott-Roth, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 138 See Rinner, supra note 29, at 1574. 
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The DOJ, however, has jurisdiction to review most mergers, but its analysis is 
limited to the transaction’s competitive effects.
139
 
In reviewing the FCC’s authority, it is useful to walk through the jurisdictional 
issues because they expose its limitations.  First, the Communications Act’s license 
transfer provisions are unambiguous.
140
  For example, if two OVDs merged—neither 
owning broadcast licenses—the FCC could not review the transaction.
141
  And no 
court could interpret broader review authority from this language. 
Second, “common carrier” authority is even more opaque.  According to the 
Telecommunications Act, “common carrier” is defined as “any person engaged as a 
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or 
interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy.”
142
  This unhelpful definition has 
become the centerpiece of several U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
decisions addressing FCC authority.  Most recently, the “common carrier” 
distinction appeared in the open internet debates.  In 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that 
the FCC had “no express statutory authority” to regulate “an Internet service 
provider’s network management practices.”
143
  The Communications Act granted 
the Commission “express and expansive authority to regulate common carrier 
services,” but Comcast remained classified as an information services provider.
144
  
Then in 2014, that same court held that the Commission had authority to regulate 
certain internet rules,
145
 but given that broadband companies were classified as 
information service providers, some FCC-promulgated rules were vacated.
146
  In 
2015, however, the FCC reclassified broadband services as common carriers, 
subjecting providers to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act.
147
  
Soon after, this question returned to the D.C. Circuit.  The Court held, in rejecting 
three separate petitions to reverse the Open Internet Order, that the Commission 
made a reasonable decision to reclassify broadband services as telecommunications 
services, thus subjecting providers to common carrier regulations.
148
  The Court 
reiterated: most consumers treat content-containing applications (information 
services) and internet providers (telecommunications services) differently.
149
  The 
Supreme Court has not heard this appeal, but one thing is clear: ad-on applications 
(OVDs) are not within the purview of common carrier regulations.
150
  While OVDs 
 
 139 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18, 18a, 21 (2012); see also MERGER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 105, at 2–3. 
 140 47 U.S.C. § 310(d). 
 141 See id. 
 142 Id. § 153(11). 
 143 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 144 Id. at 645; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 996–97 (2005) (holding the FCC classification of broadband companies as information 
services providers as lawful). 
 145 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 146 Id. at 650 (“We think it obvious that the Commission would violate the Communications 
Act were it to regulate broadband providers as common carriers.”). 
 147 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5615–16 (2015). 
 148 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 17-504 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017). 
 149 See id. at 698–700. 
 150 See id. at 698. 
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act as content aggregators, delivering video to consumers, they still require 
broadband infrastructure.
151
  The implication: the FCC has no authority to review 
OVD mergers under common carrier rules. 
The only other way the FCC might argue it has jurisdiction to regulate 
telecommunications mergers is through ancillary jurisdiction.  Section 4(i) of the 
Communications Act states that “[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, 
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this 
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”
152
  Read broadly, this 
might grant the FCC jurisdiction to review mergers beyond its traditional scope, but 
the courts have narrowly construed this passage.  To qualify for ancillary authority, 
the Commission must have jurisdiction under Title I, and the “regulations [must be] 
reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily 
mandated responsibilities.”
153
  In Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the court held that general 
policy statements were not sufficient for ancillary authority, and that such authority 
required grounding in congressional delegation.
154
  The Commission could argue 
that given the coalescence in the industry, it needs ancillary authority to govern 




Thus, the FCC’s merger authority leaves a large portion of the video market 
free from scrutiny.  For instance, imagine a world where two significant OVDs 
merge—say Netflix and Amazon.  Neither company has spectrum licenses and 
neither is a common carrier.  Despite the massive viewership and endless content 
libraries, the Commission would have no power to review this merger.  If two 
traditional networks were to merge however, say ABC and CBS, licenses would 
transfer, and the FCC would review the deal.  To provide another example, imagine 
Comcast purchases Netflix.  Again, there would be no transfer of licenses or 
infrastructure acquisition because Netflix does not broadcast its content.  The FCC 
would have no authority to oversee this transaction, despite the impact on 
consumers.  The irony is that the Commission purposefully protected OVDs and 
facilitated their growth; now it would have difficulty regulating them. 
This is not to say that these transactions would occur free from scrutiny.  Given 
the scope of these hypothetical deals, the DOJ would intervene to determine whether 
anticompetitive behavior exists.  Three serious problems are created, though, in a 
world where the FCC has jurisdiction over only a portion of the market.  First, the 
Commission might regulate mergers in a silo.  Without regard to broader market 
conditions, it is foreseeable that when the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate a merger, 
it will review the transaction in a vacuum.  In many respects, this is the approach the 
Commission took in Comcast-NBCU.  While it scrutinized the OVD and MVPD 
 
 151 While OVDs are not broadcasters, they are a better substitute for broadcast television than 
cable or broadband providers, given their focus on content production.  See FCC v. Midwest Video 
Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702 (1979) (“The Commission is directed explicitly by § 3(h) of the 
[Communications] Act not to treat persons engaged in broadcasting as common carriers.”). 
 152 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2012). 
 153 Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691–92 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 154 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 155 See Midwest, 440 U.S. at 702. 
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markets, it failed to consider downstream effects.  Thus, the ex post developments 
discussed above were overlooked. 
Second, and more likely, the FCC could regulate mergers too broadly and place 
conditions on parties to counterbalance the void in jurisdiction.  For instance, if the 
FCC were faced with a merger between a distributor and a content provider, it might 




And finally, when transactions occur, and the FCC has no jurisdiction, the 
Commission might infiltrate the DOJ processes to regulate behind the scenes.  Given 
the coordination between departments, the FCC could influence the DOJ through 
joint merger guidelines and policy statements.  While efficiency and coordination 
are good, administrative overstep is not.  Thus, these trends create regulatory 
problems—where MVPDs are overregulated and OVDs are underregulated; they 
expose the perils of dual review and the need for reform. 
Under these circumstances, it makes sense to leave the merger review process 
to the DOJ.  While its scope is limited, only reviewing mergers in light of their 
competitive effects, it has authority to review all mergers within the 
telecommunications industry.  Where the FCC has constantly played catch up to 
justify its jurisdiction, the DOJ has fewer roadblocks.  Given the constantly changing 
telecommunications landscape, it makes sense to have a dynamic merger review 
process, instead of squeezing technology into antiquated statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the problems with dual agency review, the video distribution market 
continues to thrive.  However, designing a stable process that allows review of all 
telecommunications transactions would result in greater consistency.  Companies 
would plan accordingly when faced with DOJ review, rather than face the cloud of 
uncertainty associated with the FCC.  Further, as the content and distribution 
markets converge, companies desire regulatory consistency to succeed in an 
increasingly competitive market.  And the DOJ as sole reviewer could best manage 
this process to ensure fairness and uniformity. 
 
 
 156 See LANDIS, supra note 104, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 104, at 86–
87 (highlighting the natural administrative proclivity toward more regulation). 
